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14 A pistol shot rings out in Mathare, an informal settlement in Nairobi, in the early hours 
15 of a chilly winter night. A mother, upon hearing the shot whose report rumbles through 
16 
17 the still air, puts on her slippers and walks out to investigate as she is concerned that her 
18 
19 teenage son is out late. She goes hurriedly to where the noise came from, and sees two 
20 policemen about to shoot a young man dead at point-blank range. After remonstrating 
21 
22 with, she hears one of the policemen angrily say to the other: ‘Damn it! Because of her 
23 
24 interference we will have to let him go!’, which they reluctantly do. Merely another 
25 
26 unremarkable violent incident in the slums east of Nairobi, except for the woman’s 
27 brave intervention that has allowed one lucky young man to secure reprieve from police 
28 
29 violence, at least for  now.1 
30 
31 
32 Hardly a week goes by without media reports of police shooting dead young men: one 
33 
34 week three ‘thugs’ are shot dead in daylight by police outside one of the author’s regular 
35 
36 coffee shops (Daily Nation 27 August 2014), another week five ‘thieves’ are killed at the 
37 entrance to an upmarket estate in West Nairobi2; and another along one of the city’s 
38 
39 main highways.3  And so it continues. Apparently, the narrative of ‘thugs’,   ‘thieves’, 
40 
41 ‘criminals’ and ‘gang members’, alone is sufficient to explain why these young men are 
42 
43 treated in either such a cruel and degrading manner, and, ultimately, ‘hunted’ and even 
44 ‘finished’ by the police. To a large extent, a divisive public sentiment exists. For instance, 
45 
46 a quick scan of the comments section on the Facebook page of the Nairobi News after the 
47 
48 killing of 17-year-old Stephen Gichuru in Mathare by police on May 17, 2015, shows 
49 strongly worded opinions for and against such violence. It is worth, though, highlighting 
50 
51 comments such as the one below by ‘Biggy’, which demonstrates the permeation of the 
52 
53 ‘live by the gun and die by the gun’ condemnatory   rhetoric: 
54 
55 
56 Most of these youths do not want decent    honest careers even when they are 
57 
58 offered all opportunities. They prefer the    quick money they get through violent 
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1 
2 
3 crimes. Let them be gunned down by police bullets if that is the only language 
4 
5 that  they understand. 
6 
7 
8 Beyond this rather common sentiment, when the extrajudicial executions    happen 
9 
10 outside of the ‘slums’— like in those incidents listed above — the killings attract some 
11 degree of media attention, laying publicly bare the state’s shoot-to-kill policy. But, 
12 
13 otherwise, like the earlier anecdote in the slums, such incidents usually go unreported 
14 
15 (Stephen Gichuru is one of the rare exceptions). Usually there the nation’s media is not 
16 present to bear witness to the aftermath of shootings, which often involve unarmed 
18 young men. Witnesses claim Bonokos -a popular term for weapons planted by the police 
19 
20 after the shootings- are often placed on the bodies of young men whose corpses were 
21 
22 still warm. The reality, therefore, is the continuous violence enacted upon young men 
23 within the supposedly ‘other’ Nairobi: its slums. Why, then, do these events seemingly 
24 
25 occur with such frequency, and yet civil society   does nt appear to offer radical ways    of 
26 
27 tackling such violence. Or, put simply, following Pithouse (2015) who indeed ‘counts 
28 and who doesn’t’ in the violent postcolonial city, and why? 
29 
30 
31 
32 The article looks at such experiences of ‘everyday violence’ in Mathare,4 and the 
33 challenges civil society face in addressing the extrajudicial executions (EJE) of young 
35 men. Above all, the paper seeks to better understand the apparent lack of any lasting 
36 
37 solutions to the problem and also why EJE appears to be a ‘normalised’ phenomenon in 
38 
39 Kenya. More specifically, since 2010, despite a purportedly transformational 
40 constitution and multi-sector engagement in police and policy reform, the problem of 
41 
42 violence remains unabated, and as data shows, is worsening. Our analysis, therefore, 
43 
44 locates EJE, along with community-level demands for safety, within the broader terrain 
45 of state and population interaction and political engagement (Chatterjee, 2004), as 
46 
47 illustrated through two important dynamics. First, we recognise the important role and 
48 
49 different contributions of a wide variety of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
50 addressing the deep-rooted problem of police violence. But in explaining the limited 
52 impact of their responses we identify how ‘NGOisation’ has dented    their impact. 
53 
54 Second, conversely, we highlight the grassroots struggles of activists in Mathare, often in 
55 
56 response to NGO interventions. We use participant observation of activities associated 
57 with the Mathare Social Justice Centre (MSJC); these include field mobilisation events, 
58 
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1 
2 
3 and community ‘dialogues’ that seek to document and raise awareness of the scope and 
4 
5 nature of EJE, and qualitative interviews with 8 activists. Our methodology and analysis 
6 strives to incorporate the potential for ‘autonomous social forces’ (Hearn, 2007) to act. 
7 
8 
9 
10 In our reading of EJE, it is the politics of the everyday that shape understandings of 
11 political engagement. It is this ‘everyday violence’ we seek to use to explain the seeming 
12 
13 disjuncture that exists between grassroots and    particularly NGO efforts against EJE. 
14 
15 
16 
Theorizing The Politics of the Everyday:  Engagement and   Violence 
18 Pithouse’s (2015) provocative   piece describes how the spatial order of the colonial   city 
19 
20 continues to structure interactions between the state and those governed – to the extent, 
21 
22 he argues, that we normalise the occurrence of police killings. Other authors support 
23 this claim, such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:7), who argues that it is the ‘coloniality of 
24 
25 being’ that connects the colonial period to the present: the horror of colonial violence 
26 
27 enacted upon racialized subjects that becomes ‘routinised as the African mode of being’. 
28 These are important elements in seeking to explaining the apparent fissure in political 
29 
30 responses to violence within the postcolonial city. Chatterjee (2004),    however, deepens 
31 
32 our understandings of the dissonance between these excluded spaces where inhabitants 
33 ‘are only tenuously, and even then ambiguously and contextually rights-bearing citizens 
35 in the sense imagined by the constitution’ and ‘an actually existing arena of institutions 
36 
37 and practices inhabited by a relatively small section of the people’ (Chatterjee 2004:38). 
38 
39 Though it’s debatable whether Chatterjee underplays the potential for the state 
40 extending rights to the excluded, the major contribution of his conceptual framework – 
41 
42 and of particular relevance here – is to identify a split in the political field: on the one 
43 
44 hand, civil society, as ‘the closed association of modern elite groups, sequestered from 
45 the wider popular life of communities, walled up with enclaves of civic freedom and 
46 
47 rational law’; and on the other political society, which he defines as ‘large sections of 
48 
49 rural and urban poor, [who] make claims on government not within the framework of 
50 stable constitutionally defined right and laws but direct political negotiations…’ 
52 (Chatterjee 2004:4). What enables this political negotiation by the excluded is the shift 
53 
54 in state organisation towards governmentality and its  attendant activities   and 
55 
56 expectations, thus producing a new interface between government and the population, 
57 according to Chatterjee. But his is not a disabling and depoliticising governmentality but 
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1 
2 
3 rather one that enables political encounters and negotiations. Chatterjee’s    analysis is 
4 
5 also politically dynamic as it centres upon the everyday struggles of the excluded to 
6 survive and eke benefits from state interventions and programmes. In so doing, 
7 
8 Chatterjee forcefully moves beyond some previous analyses that tend to regard the 
9 
10 grassroots as somehow “pre-modern” and in need of taming and civilising by ‘civil 
11 society’. 
12 
13 
14 
15 But his framework (even allowing for modifications over the years), has opened up 
16 several lines of critique (see Gudavarthy, 2014; Hart, 2015). Most problematically, 
18 Chatterjee over-states the binary separation of civil and political societies (as if ‘oil and 
19 
20 water’ following Corbridge’s assessment in Gudavarthy, 2014), and underplays    their 
21 
22 inter-connectivity in terms, for example, of how modern elites routinely break laws to 
23 their own advantage. Conversely, many excluded communities strive for legal protection 
24 
25 even as they deal in illegal activities. Similarly, many voluntary associations    that 
26 
27 comprise political society in fact have to mirror the regulatory structures of NGOs within 
28 civil society, such as registration and the official organizational hierarchies to achieve a 
29 
30 particular status. Rather, what may be taking place is the use of different types of 
31 
32 political engagement rather than any real empirical difference between them (see 
33 individual chapters in Gudavarthy, 2014). Furthermore, Chatterjee’s lens of 
35 governmentality – this    is arguably less relevant in Nairobi’s neglected slums devoid of 
36 
37 the most basic of government programmes – is criticized for lacking a transformative 
38 
39 potential because of his focus on incremental micro-politics. It can also be argued that 
40 the lack of radical potential is also underemphasized because Chatterjee does not look at 
41 
42 broader social movements that contest state sovereignty. Chatterjee,    however, 
43 
44 maintains that he is simply not seeing that kind of politics in his    fieldwork. 
45 
46 
47 These criticisms, and indeed Chatterjee’s erudite    responses to them (2011, 2014), not 
48 
49 withstanding, his analysis remains of central significance precisely because of the 
50 persistent zones of exclusion, like those in which young men in Mathare find themselves. 
52 Certainly, these spaces are and can be breached. But what if that is the exception rather 
53 
54 than, as we see it, the norm of exclusion? We recognise Chatterjee’s continuing relevance 
55 
56 for what we are seeing in Nairobi. However, we also believe that his version of 
57 governmentality unfortunately tends to obscure the violence and brutality that is the 
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1 
2 
3 dark underside not only of governmentality, but also of how that violence embeds itself 
4 
5 in the the politics of the  ‘everyday’. 
6 
7 
8 By extending these claims it becomes clear that an integral feature of the urban 
9 
10 postcolonial condition is the experience of different forms of violence – a condition that 
11 has clear implications for Kenya’s development more broadly, and more specifically the 
12 
13 ability of young men from impoverished conditions to  survive and thrive. In addition    to 
14 
15 Pithouse’s and Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s assertions, and with reference to Chatterjee, this 
16 paper deploys Das’ (2007) work on the ‘descent into the ordinary’ as the primary 
18 conceptual tool to understand the logic of everyday police violence    and people’s 
19 
20 responses to it. We argue that the way grassroots activists articulate their lived 
21 
22 experiences of extrajudicial killings – from dealing with the loss of family members, 
23 neighbours and friends, to the real and perceived dangers of walking through certain 
24 
25 parts of Mathare – is ‘a mutual absorption of the violent and the ordinary’ (Das 2007: 7). 
26 
27 It is through these processes to define and defeat such acts of extreme violence and their 
28 associated trauma, that activists create their own theory of violence: one that frames 
29 
30 their strategies and intentions    particularly vis-à-vis NGOs and more importantly sheds 
31 
32 light on why and how they themselves have mobilised. The emphasis on the ‘ordinary’, 
33 ‘everyday’ or ‘normal’, as inspired by Das’ work, is highly important to this discussion as 
35 it feeds into the debate described in greater detail below, regarding whether NGOs can 
36 
37 actually capture the essence of what local people – in this case in Mathare – experience 
38 
39 and subsequently mobilise in productive and meaningful   ways. 
40 
41 
42 Focusing primarily on the women who suffered abduction, rape, and the murder of 
43 
44 husbands, brothers and sons during the Indian Partition (1947) and anti-Sikh massacres 
45 (1984), Das argues that her interlocutors define themselves as ‘subjects’ in unexpected 
46 
47 ways. More specifically, rather than creating an ‘opposition    between the experience of 
48 
49 violence as a victim/survivor and that of the subject … [it is] the ability to recraft the 
50 symbols and genres of mourning that made them active in the highly contested domain 
52 of politics’ (217). We extend her incisive analysis to the context of EJE in Mathare: it is 
53 
54 the very narrativisation of everyday experiences that  enables the grassroots    movement 
55 
56 studied to separate itself and articulate a difference from the NGO work currently taking 
57 place, as will be discussed in the later sections. They can identify as victims but this 
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1 
2 
3 positioning has multiple ‘plot-lines’ and repertoires that do not indicate    a 
4 
5 submissiveness or defeat. On the contrary, for these activists it is precisely ‘victims’ who 
6 simultaneously hold agency in halting the everyday violence that frames their lives, a 
7 
8 violence that they know most acutely as it has become mundane. Therefore, like the 
9 
10 women Das (2007) speaks of, this understanding (or theory) of violence as part of 
11 everyday life allows activists to self-identify beyond the framing purely of ‘victims’ and 
12 
13 instead recognise themselves as people best positioned to encroach and halt    this 
14 
15 violence in its everyday manifestations. Thus, for Mathare social justice activists the 
16 violence is linked to the ‘normal’ or ‘everyday’ – through comments about the frequency 
18 of such deaths, the sense that it is a ‘normal’ way to die, but also that it must be a normal 
19 
20 and everyday fight to halt its fight, and preserve life in their   community. 
21 
22 
23 What makes this study timely and of deep empirical and theoretical    interest – in 
24 
25 addition to the deep ‘ethics of responsibility’ (ibid: 218) that we as researchers feel 
26 
27 when documenting violence – is the youth-led aspect of this work and their focus on the 
28 ‘everyday’. The ‘shared symbols’ through which activism becomes materialised is 
29 
30 intertwined with youth    and local marginalisation from NGO spaces (due to age, 
31 
32 experience, language and other barriers), the commonality of experience that often 
33 becomes lost in translation through regimented and bureaucratic ways of operating at 
35 NGOs, and the very real risks that activists take on that NGO staff often do not bear. 
36 
37 
38 
39 We thus seek to link this very anthropological and geographical understanding of social 
40 worlds and lived experiences to development studies and understandings of civil 
41 
42 society: namely, how do NGOs fit into this ‘normalised violence’ and at what points are 
43 
44 divergent (anti)politics between civil society and political society (Chatterjee, 2004) 
45 created at the grassroots level? 
46 
47 
48 
49 Extrajudicial Executions in Kenya 
50 While there has been literature on police violence in informal settlements, particularly 
52 in the Latin American and South Asian context (see Auyero, 2012 and Mehta, 2004), the 
53 
54 Kenya-based literature    is largely focused on the 2007 and 2013 elections and 
55 
56 furthermore, the intersection of everyday violence and justice efforts is particularly 
57 understudied. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 EJE, torture and cruel and degrading treatment at the hands of the police have been 
6 ever-present stains on Kenya’s human rights record. Prior to and following 
7 
8 independence in 1963, there have been gross human rights violations associated with 
9 
10 each administration. From the post-1991 era, though civil-society organisations (CSOs) 
11 started using the newly available opportunities to engage in democratic spaces, police 
12 
13 reform has still lagged. It is equally important to note that despite the new arena for 
14 
15 engagement, some five years prior to the enactment of the constitution, Holmquist’s 
16 (2005:213) pertinent observations about the ‘gap’ between the national level and 
18 popular demands. 
19 
20 
21 
22 The ‘gap’ resonates with the approach by Chatterjee (2004), mentioned earlier, which 
23 suggests caution when immediately celebrating the declaration in 2010 of a new 
24 
25 Constitution, that included a Bill of Rights with articles on protection from torture, and 
26 
27 cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. Though clearly very important 
28 features of the new dispensation, these provisions have not proven sufficient in 
29 
30 prohibiting torture and providing redress clauses. One of the key drivers of torture, for 
31 
32 example, is the strong correlation in Kenya between the power to arbitrarily arrest and 
33 unlawfully detain an individual. Criticisms include the ‘persistent allegations of on-going 
35 EJE, enforced disappearances, and excessive use of force by    police officers, especially 
36 
37 during ‘special operations’, as well as the low rate of investigations, and prosecutions of 
38 
39 such acts’ (see UNCAT, 2013). Furthermore, there has also been a paradigm shift away 
40 from political victims of torture to one of ‘everyday’ abuses associated with the 
41 
42 criminalisation of poverty and police excessive use of firearms. These drivers all suggest 
43 
44 that substantive protection and promotion of human rights requires a legal, policy and 
45 institutional framework (KHRC, 2013) and, we should add, grassroots mobilisation of 
46 
47 civil society. Many CSOs have pro-actively sought to reposition and renew their 
48 
49 relevance for an era laden with possibilities for reform. However, in transitional states 
50 such as Kenya, a salient reminder is that:’[t]he cohabitation between politicians and civil 
52 society organisations, particularly those in the human rights and democracy    sector, 
53 
54 becomes a delicate balance’ (Miano, 2009:   226). 
55 
56 
57 
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1 
2 
3 It is a balance currently being tested by two inter-related challenges: state responses 
4 
5 and public reaction to waves of insecurity and violations by the state plaguing the 
6 country (Open Society, 2013); and also the politics surrounding the International 
7 
8 Criminal Court (ICC) cases, which have also engulfed state-civil society relations. Though 
9 
10 there are new possibilities for engagement, Kenyan civil society activists are very 
11 concerned about state-led attacks on CSOs that induce unpredictability in the policy and 
12 
13 political environment (Kiai, 2013). Another enduring challenge is therefore the level of 
14 
15 impunity following abuses that have been ‘normalised and institutionalised’ in Kenya 
16 (TJRC, 2013). In relation, a vital ingredient in police reforms concerns whether an 
18 adequate balance between internal and external    stimuli can be created to support 
19 
20 incentives for substantive change. Evidence suggests that it is the top echelon of police 
21 
22 services that needs to embrace reforms and then convey them to the rank-and-file police 
23 culture. But in Kenya it is precisely ‘the top’ that understand the police force as a means 
24 
25 to exert political control and maintain vested interests (Hornsby,    2013). 
26 
27 
28 The police are considered to be the most corrupt and least trusted public institution in 
29 
30 the country (see Hornsby 2013). Since 2002, with a genuine multi-party transition, NGO 
31 
32 and police activity has taken place, as mentioned, within a landscape of political and 
33 policy reform. Yet, the need for broader systemic reform soon became apparent as the 
35 Kibaki administration began to utilise older modes of state repression – as seen under 
36 
37 Moi’s authoritarian government – most notably, with the renewal of EJE.    One 
38 
39 organisation tracked 1,873 deaths resulting from gunshot wounds over a five-year 
40 period, 87% of which occurred in Nairobi (IMLU, 2014). While the majority of these 
41 
42 deaths (67%) occurred during law enforcement interventions, it was often unclear the 
43 
44 circumstances of police involvement, particularly why the use of deadly force became 
45 necessary. While we would argue that this is a very conservative tally, even this low-ball 
46 
47 figure amounts to effectively one police death every day for five years – a situation that 
48 
49 is unfortunately considered ‘normal’ by mainstream media and the many members of 
50 the public. Another organisation, the Oscar Foundation Free Legal Clinic, released a 
52 report in 2008 that documented at least 8,000 young men had been killed by the police 
53 
54 in what was, ostensibly, a crackdown on the Mungiki movement.5  A year after    that 
55 
56 report was released, human rights lawyer Oscar Kingara and his collaborative 
57 researcher John Paul Oulu were assassinated, ironically in a similar fashion to the very 
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1 
2 
3 extra-judicial    killings they sought tirelessly to document. The Oscar Foundation Free 
4 
5 Legal Clinic was the only formal organisation that came close to documenting what was 
6 being lived on the ground (for instance, one of the authors worked with young women in 
7 
8 one ward in Mathare constituency between 2007-9, and many of these women had 
9 
10 husbands and brothers, even a sister, who had been disappeared. Some of these families 
11 are still haunted by the fact that they never found the bodies of their kin to bury). 
12 
13 
14 
15 While not to the same extent as the ‘Mungiki period’ (i.e. the period of EJE and 
16 disappearance of militia members, particularly, 2006-2007), young people, especially 
18 young men, are still being shot at an alarming rate in Mathare and other poor urban 
19 
20 settlements. An extrajudicial working document compiled by Mathare    Social Justice 
21 
22 Centre, itself a complex and arduous task due to the trauma, silence and fear that 
23 circulate around these killings, shows that most of the young people shot are under age 
24 
25 30 and have been framed by the police post-killing as ‘thieves’ or ‘threats to security’.6 
26 
27 Furthermore, their families tend not to register a case with NGOs, or, the police or police 
28 oversight committees for a variety of structural factors including lack of bus fare, fear 
29 
30 and overall distrust of these bodies. For those who do register a case,     it is a story of 
31 
32 being engulfed in the bureaucratic ‘politics of waiting’ (Auyero 2012) (referred to in 
33 police-speak as ‘further investigations’) that is exacerbated by widely held ideas of 
35 young men in Mathare as criminals deserving of   death. 
36 
37 
38 
39 NGOs and Democratic Space: Professionalisation to What Effect? 
40 A well-developed literature has emerged on NGOs, looking not only at their 
41 
42 contributions but also a critical examination of their practices and structures (see Lewis 
43 
44 and Kanji, 2009; Hearn, 1998, 2001; Mercer, 2002 amongst others). In recent years, 
45 debates have begun to identify, more explicitly, the specific ways in which many NGOs 
46 
47 are not only complicit in furthering neo-liberal modes of contesting the state but also in 
48 
49 acting at the expense sometimes of those they claim to be supporting. The emphasis on 
50 donor driven accountability also contributes to de-politicising NGO work and to further 
52 reflect the regulation and containment of grassroots and other    community-based 
53 
54 struggles. Managers are pressured to ‘professionalise’ (O’Flahtery and  Ulrich, 2010),   and 
55 
56 act, seemingly, with middle class interests. There are additional aspects to the process of 
57 professionalisation, including, for example, how NGOs become side-tracked by having to 
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1 
2 
3 fulfil contractual obligations to strengthen and perform technical and    managerial 
4 
5 capability. Our aim here is not to rehash these debates but to rather explore whether 
6 NGOs, specifically in Mathare, meaningfully capture what local people experience and 
7 
8 subsequently mobilise in inclusive and productive   ways. 
9 
10 
11 In Kenya, for example, NGOs frame EJE as part of the current sinister ‘counter-terrorism’ 
12 regime to attract money from larger human rights bodies such as Amnesty International. 
14 This narrow perspective does not view EJE as part of the very longue duree of colonial 
15 
16 and neo-colonial    urban governance that legitimises these kinds of violence(s). Moreover, 
17 
18 the spatial dimension of EJE – as specific ‘killing spots’ in slums and the heightened 
19 occurrence in the wider Mathare locale itself – is disregarded. 
20 
21 
22 The following section looks at responses of contemporary grassroots    human rights 
23 
24 activists in Mathare, as well as residents’ concerns regarding issues of    EJE. 
25 
26 
27 Grassroots  Engagement 
28 
29 Youth have been a longstanding part of daily life in Mathare.      Due to a climate of the very 
30 
31 legitimate fear that surrounds mobilisation, it is only in the last few years that they have 
32 been more explicit about and comprehensively organising around these killings. We 
33 
34 draw on interviews from eight respondents who form most of the core members (and 
35 
36 creators) of the Mathare Social Justice Centre (MSJC). Our main discussion with these 
37 youth activists living in the Mathare constituency focused on the creation of MSJC: the 
38 
39 focus from the onset on EJEs and why the activists felt it was necessary to come together 
40 
41 despite the number of NGOs working on EJE issues. We also draw on our observations 
42 
43 from four public fora held by MSJC, where local community members aired grievances 
44 and suggested ways forward; the first three events attracted over 80 participants at 
45 
46 each. These fora have been important public events to situate a response to EJE in the 
47 
48 ‘everyday’, as residents make efforts to link violence to the social fabric, in a vein similar 
49 to the work by Das (2004) mentioned earlier. 
50 
51 
52 
53 One respondent, when asked about why she had joined the MSJC, and chose a leadership 
54 position, identified a deeply embedded context of police brutality. She drew on her own 
55 
56 terrifying encounters with the police and, more traumatic, the killing of her brother by 
57 
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1 
2 
3 the police. Common to the accounts of the activists we interviewed, she also talked about 
4 
5 the current and on-going police actions in her   settlement: 
6 
7 
8 I want to see the police behave. I want police to give us peace and respect us as 
9 citizens of Kenya. Police are very notorious. I was with dad and I had left my 
10 phone. I went to the house to get it…there was darkness and no electricity for last 
11 
12 three days in the settlement. As I went back I heard gunshots and I was told by 
13 my dad to get into the house but I peek...I can see three policemen…they have 
14 cuffs and they are beating people seriously, and then shooting into the air…I go 
15 out and watch…a person being beaten is shouting saying they are not doing 
17 anything wrong and the police are saying “shut up”- I want this to stop! I feel the 
18 police are not competent…and it’s the same one misbehaving several times… 
19 (R6). 
20 
21 
22 
Her references to electricity outages, gunshots,    police brutality, and vulnerable shack 
23 
24 dwellings, all invoke insecure spaces. Indeed, one MSJC-organised  forum,   though 
25 
26 intended to explicitly explore EJE, saw participants share such experiences linked to 
27 broader structural issues, such as the pattern of land-grabbing and, in addition, the 
29 climate of fear that pervades  Mathare: 
30 
31 
32 
33 At the meeting we shared experiences with land-grabbing and extrajudicial 
34 killings, and the connections between these that occur due to the collaborations 
35 between landowners, the chief, the city council and the police who threaten many 
36 youth including our members… While we spoke and shared with each other, one 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 Everyday concerns are therefore invoked alongside rights enshrined in the Kenyan 
46 Constitution. But action is inhibited by fear; it is this ‘tomorrow’ and the fear of not living 
47 
48 to see it that deepens what the everyday means for residents. MSJC members regard the 
49 
50 difference between themselves and other actors in the community as how they were less 
51 
52 afraid of tackling issues compared to others. Many of the group members often voiced 
53 how they are were ‘tired of losing generations’ and did not want to see that happen 
54 
55 anymore. Another respondent (R7), for example, had been a former gang member. After 
56 
57 seeing his entire ‘squad’ of 15 members killed either by the police or rival gangs, and the 
  
sentiment from many people was “why should we give birth when the police are killing 
our children with such impunity?”’…(ibid.). 
 
 
1 
2 
3 shock of being the only survivor, this respondent was compelled to challenge the gang’s 
4 
5 fatalism and the apparent expendability of young men in the slum and so he joined MSJC. 
6 
7 
8 Another theme, or ‘shared symbol’ to draw on our earlier discussion of Das (2004) has 
9 
10 been the activists’ rejection of the pervasive labelling of young men as ‘thieves’; MSJC 
11 members and audiences have instead inverted this discourse, labelling police and 
12 
13 political leaders as the real ‘thieves’ and ‘criminals’ of the country. Similarly, another 
14 
15 narrativisation tactic is to evoke concerns of childbirth and parenting, but in the specific 
16 context of the everyday inevitability of the police killing their children because ‘[T]he 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 Themes therefore emerged that lay the foundations for a divergence between residents 
24 
25 and their everyday, and those actors supposedly representing them. One    particularly 
26 
27 important set of actors are NGOs. And in specific discussions with activists, several 
28 additional themes emerged from interviews. 
29 
30 
31 
32 The Grassroots and NGOs 
33 The activists depicted a metaphoric gap, along the lines of that mentioned by Chatterjee 
34 
35 earlier,   between themselves - as grassroots - and the NGOs. For instance,   one 
36 
37 respondent described NGOs in the following terms: ‘They only recognise the people “up 
38 
39 there”, whereas we feel we are not being supported as we are “down here” [literally in a 
40 valley]. And the NGOs act as cartels
8 for their own self-interests; work with bigger 
41 
42 people and do not address our issues.’ The same respondent also explained this ‘gap’ in 
43 
44 terms of the lack of appropriate actors to whom she could turn to and provide the 
45 extensive data on violence –including gun shots- she collected on a monthly basis 
46 
47 because the ‘bigger’ actors did not demonstrate   any interest. 
48 
49 
50 
In relation, a particular affront to local activists was the perceived     lack of presence on 
51 
52 the ground of NGOs purportedly working on EJE. One high profile event was evoked by 
53 
54 respondents who attended (R2,3,8). It concerned a ‘field day’ by the Kenyan National 
55 
56 Human Rights Commission (KNHRC) to document cases, at an event held at the Huruma 
57 Sports grounds prior to the election in 2013. But activists strongly criticised the event as 
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1 
2 
3 a sham because they argued that there were inadequate attempts to work with local 
4 
5 activists in advance, which was also reflected in poor numbers attending. One spoke 
6 about KNHRC’s fleeting presence, and how she observed that many of the tents erected 
7 
8 for the day remained empty because the organisers had not effectively mobilised the 
9 
10 community, again indicating tenuous links to the   community. 
11 
12 
13 In addition, another (R8), also accused the KNHRC of using a locally compiled report 
14 
15 inaccurately and, indeed, as a result, grossly undercounting the prevalence of EJE in the 
16 settlement. What is interesting to note is how the activists’ criticism of the event was 
18 articulated angrily by reference to differences in class, in terms of the status and also 
19 
20 geographic isolation of the organisation (more    accurately, a government commission) in 
21 
22 question in its posh suburb of Nairobi. Indeed, these attributes were all regarded as 
23 indicting lack of relevance to the community: 
24 
25 
26 
27 The police and the Kenyan National Human Rights Commission [and others] 
28 came out to us for a field day. And we said: “Don’t you come here in your suits 
29 
30 and in your big cars … because we are the ones who deal with the violations … 
31 
32 this is why we are proposing our own centre   [MSJC].”(R3). 
33 
34 
35 For local activists, such an event therefore epitomised the    apparent gap between 
36 
37 ‘respectable’ civil society and their insincerity in working with the local community. 
38 Additional contributory factors to the perceived ‘gap’ also concerned levels of education. 
39 
40 Some activists suggested that lower education, also denoted by a lesser ability to speak 
41 
42 ‘good’ English, formed a social barrier that inhibited activists from going   engaging   civil 
43 
44 society. The grassroots then becomes reified as being ‘on the ground’ and maintaining 
45 the habitus and vernacular of the community themselves. 
46 
47 
48 
49 Disproportionate Risks and Costs 
50 Almost all the respondents also highlighted the nature of a ‘gap’ in terms of resources 
51 
52 and    disproportionate risk, both of which often overlapped. For human rights activists 
53 
54 and residents, making reports about incidents at the local level could prove a serious 
55 risk for themselves and their families. More specifically, if the confidentiality or the 
56 
57 
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1 
2 
3 guarantee of protection could not    be promised, then giving evidence against a violator 
4 
5 meant risking becoming a  victim: 
6 
7 
8 A major challenge here in Mathare is witnessing cases- people    always ask about 
9 
10 their safety if they act as witnesses. People fear giving reports; and people also 
11 are not aware of witness protection and they don’t feel it in any case. For 
12 
13 example, I would choose not to if it meant… [that] I might be covered    and 
14 
15 protected but my children and family would not. (Respondent   2). 
16 
17 
18 In relation, there is a sizeable cost burden in getting victims help, and this includes, for 
19 
20 instance, transporting the victim to the hospital    and potentially helping with 
21 
22 recuperation costs. The paucity of resources was keenly felt especially in contrast to 
23 those of the big NGOs. 
24 
25 
26 
27 Professionalism of NGOs/Civil Society 
28 Associated with the disconnect mentioned above, the respondents talked about a sense 
29 
30 of exclusion from NGOs, where they felt disqualified because they did not possess 
31 
32 ‘proper’ education credentials. It was a double-edged complaint: on the one hand 
33 respondents conveyed a sense of being overlooked, but also acknowledged that one 
35 could never qualify for a job given the insurmountable educational barriers. Both the 
36 
37 social and geographic gaps coalesce in the activists’ understanding of their position vis- 
38 
39 à-vis NGOs: namely that ‘NGOs don’t employ people from the slums,’ (R1) nor do they 
40 appear to listen to the voices from these spaces. 
41 
42 
43 
44 The critique activists made of NGOs having strict educational qualifications is also 
45 tempered by the rejection of what they depicted as a ‘soul-less’ pursuit of degrees, a 
46 
47 careerism that seemed to take the energy out of the movement. One leading human 
48 
49 rights defender puts it as follows: ‘We had a movement in place, but after the donors 
50 came then it became about degrees and the professionalism has killed passion. And no 
52 new cadres with an understanding of human rights are emerging. The movement is no 
53 
54 longer growing’ (R1). 
55 
56 
57 
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1 
2 
3 The same activist also drew out some other less obvious implications    of 
4 
5 professionalisation, namely, in terms of what it meant for strategising and tactics for 
6 furthering human rights struggles: 
7 
8 
9 
10 I think [the National level NGO in question] directors and staff, they would not 
11 feel ok to take coffins of extra- judicial killings victims to parliament building or 
12 
13 to the office of the Inspector general of police …     as a way of protest, as before 
14 
15 ...which was our activism, our court appearance solidarity and, now, this kind of 
16 human rights activism is not for professional human rights workers who are 
18 looking  for career   in government human rights agencies, in boards of   Directors, 
19 
20 are magistrates and middle class working in the   government. 
21 
22 
23 But this is of course not to say that activists themselves are not looking for enhanced 
24 
25 opportunities that NGOs also represent. Many could, for example,   rattle off the   number 
26 
27 of workshops and trainings provided by NGOs that they had attended. Furthermore, 
28 activists all drew instrumentally upon seeking (limited) protection that some NGOs can 
29 
30 offer, particularly to local human rights defenders. Some respondents had even    been 
31 
32 employed short term by NGOs and let go of for varying reasons. Though there are 
33 clearly overlapping interests, which sometimes coalesce, it does not dissipate the sense 
35 of exclusion from access to resources and influence that the NGOs command. Activists 
36 
37 repeatedly scorned the waste of resources by NGOs –for instance, inappropriate training 
38 
39 in expensive hotels or ‘fake’ local workshops- in contrast to their actual needs and 
40 struggles not being met. Indeed, knowing how much in the way of resources are directed 
41 
42 to the professional human rights sector and that only a tiny amount trickles to local 
43 
44 activists work in slums, and that they face various barriers, is likely another important 
45 reason for regarding NGOs as distant from the ‘everyday’. 
46 
47 
48 
49 Data ‘mining’ 
50 Alongside the emergence of professionalism, another inter-related effect concerning the 
51 
52 shift to evidence based interventions is   the role of information gathering   and 
53 
54 compilation, and the attendant use of research and reports. A widespread view existed 
55 of NGOs as too preoccupied with mining informal settlements for information without 
56 
57 any feedback loop or process to follow-up the report writing. In other words, activists 
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1 
2 
3 considered them as opportunistic ‘parachute’ researchers and consultants.    This 
4 
5 attribution stemmed from a perception that NGOs needed to be seen as evidence based, 
6 as if engaged with the grassroots, and so heavily relied on ‘producing’ data from 
7 
8 informal settlements towards the ends of their funding cycle, bearing in mind that their 
9 
10 report writing periods needed to demonstrate an ‘engagement’ with the grassroots. This 
11 tendency, inevitably, according to the activists, resulted in a superficial presence. 
12 
13 Respondents recalled an event where another high profile NGO documenting EJE and 
14 
15 building forensic evidence for specific cases, invited local young men and members from 
16 the local police force to discuss crime and policing in Mathare. Throughout the 
18 proceedings, local    activists were concerned at how the meeting became an opportunity 
19 
20 for the police to profile young men and gather information that was then used against 
21 
22 them being passed on to the local police station to identify attendees who had 
23 perpetrated the crimes. The forum ended up generating conflict at community level, and 
24 
25 the NGO in question did not return, nor did any subsequent follow up of the situation to 
26 
27 mitigate this tension. As a consequence, the issue of information extraction was 
28 therefore associated both with the risk of sharing information and also the use and 
29 
30 validity of the findings and misplaced sending priorities resources. As articulated by one 
31 
32 respondent (R2): 
33 
34 
35 Whereas an NGO is just an office, maybe [with] nice computers, but we are the 
36 ones with the information and it is risky for us…We feel donors don’t realise the 
37 challenges we face- and so they don’t get the real report. Big organisations don’t 
38 
39 know me. We don’t know how they will use information nor about the impact- so 
40 many people don’t bother to approach them. 
41 
42 
43 The use of reports was associated with spaces other than within which the information 
44 
45 was gathered. Respondents described their own role in assisting in the report process, 
46 but then only for the final product to be presented in distant fora, not only in elite 
47 
48 spaces of Nairobi but also in New York and London, which were simply inaccessible for 
49 
50 the people whose violations were the basis of the reports. The perception of data and 
51 experiences extracted in order to feed an image designed for ‘impact’ on donors and the 
53 national media were considered as further proof of divorce from the    grassroots 
54 
55 
56 
57 Ethnicity 
  
17 
34 
51 
 
 
1 
2 
3 Another barrier identified by activists involving NGOs included the   role of ethnicity   and 
4 
5 how this politicised accountability. Most visibly, respondents made a link to the broader 
6 contemporary problem of the politicisation and active encouragement of ethnic 
7 
8 divisions by politicians in Mathare, and in the country at large. There had been several 
9 
10 instances of the harassment of local human rights defenders, especially those who shone 
11 light on the corrupt actions of local politicians. Respondents described how the human 
12 
13 rights movement was dealt a severe blow by alleged ‘violators’ being voted through 
14 
15 their parties into national government. In relation, the ICC cases also encouraged an 
16 ethnicisation of human rights issues. Instances involved human rights defenders, from 
18 the President’s ethnic group, who were allegedly rewarded either to act as spies for the 
19 
20 ruling Jubilee coalition or inproviding deliberately false evidence at the ICC hearings. 
21 
22 
23 But ethnicisation had already started and apparently escalated in the transition    from 
24 
25 Moi’s KANU regime to the next administration led by Mwai Kibake. Respondents     spoke 
26 
27 about their perception of the ethnicisation of institutions and actors, and how several 
28 NGOs were perceived as predominantly representing the interests of one or other 
29 
30 particular ethnic group. It has led to implications for whether or not cases are pursued. 
31 
32 In dealing with sensitive information about perpetrators, for example, ethnic affiliation 
33 is not considered neutral but rather added in as a factor in the calculation of risk. All 
35 respondents mentioned that they would think twice about approaching particular NGOs 
36 
37 because of their ethnic outlook, due to it being   both pointless but also   potentially 
38 
39 dangerous. One (R3) mentioned, for example, how he had collected what he perceived 
40 as strong evidence on three policemen involved in EJE. But he feared the consequences 
41 
42 of delivering the information. One prominent NGO was regarded   as sitting on   the 
43 
44 information presented and failed to respond, a contention from the grassroots that is 
45 heard widely. At other times, the risk is that sensitive information may be passed on to 
46 
47 the accused violator. For this activist, the distrust was related to how ethnicity confused 
48 
49 the clear distinction between duty bearer and rights holders because the two can ’can 
50 become friends’ due to shared group affiliation. Whether in law enforcement, or, 
52 otherwise, actors were described more generally as ‘…people, even in NGOs [that] are in 
53 
54 ethnic cocoons more than ever…’. Another allegedly ethnicised NGO includes    one 
55 
56 prominent in the work on torture and EJE, where the respondent had been employed: 
57 ‘[T]he directors of [ the national level NGO] also became complicit with the NARC regime 
  
 
 
1 
2 
3 [political coalition that replaced Moi’s KANU regime], as some of their relatives were 
4 
5 working in government; they would sanction against extra-judicial killings or prison 
6 reports that would expose the regime.’ 
7 
8 
9 
10 Another respondent (R2) spoke of attempts to pursue complaints against local police 
11 involved in fabricating robbery, allegedly for their own gains. But upon approaching the 
12 
13 ombudsman who was from the same clan within the ethnic group as the accused were 
14 
15 from, the respondent was asked to drop the case immediately. There are surely many 
16 other factors determining the strength of allegations, and therefore the grounds to 
17 
18 pursue a case. Nonetheless, it appears that ethnicity is very important in determining 
19 
20 whether an issue or case will be  pursued. 
21 
22 
23 Discussion 
24 
25 A fissure in perception and actions     is very apparent. And though we don’t want to give 
26 
27 the impression of any absolute binary separation between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society – 
28 because activists clearly, as mentioned, at times overlap with civil society spaces and 
29 
30 resources, there is, nonetheless, undeniably, an exclusionary logic taking place. But even 
31 
32 when these harmful effects occur, does it necessarily imply that NGOs are inevitably 
33 always ignoring or compromising grass roots activism? 
34 
35 
36 
37 Neocosmos (2007) maintains that NGOs and human rights can never truly exist in a 
38 discrete space. He reasons that NGOs are institutionalised within states, and this renders 
39 
40 them deeply ambiguous in relation to power. This and related critiques of the 
41 
42 channelling of social change through institutional spaces prescribed and    largely 
43 
44 controlled by the state, go to the heart of debates over tactics and terrains of struggle in 
45 many African countries. As such they have special salience because many of the main 
46 
47 preoccupations of rights-based NGOs in South Africa, and increasingly    in Kenya, for 
48 
49 example, has been to use institutional arenas, such as the policy and legal system to 
50 secure rights. In terms of political opportunity and engagement by NGOs, Madlingozi 
51 
52 (2014) regards the importance of the scale at which an organisation works as having 
53 
54 significant bearing on their tactics. In other words, there is a clear distinction existing 
55 between national and local levels. The national level organisations tend to be better 
56 
57 resourced and through    elite connections are able to successfully harness the generous 
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1 
2 
3 civil and political spaces that exist in a country like South Africa. On the other hand, local 
4 
5 counter-hegemonic organisations struggle to mobilise resources and encounter 
6 oppression and violations of their rights. 
7 
8 
9 
10 Arguably, more nuance might be provided to the debates by actual empirical 
11 assessments and reflections on whether democratic space has been opened or closed 
12 
13 (Langford, 2015)    by NGOs. Documenting actual outcomes and successful modalities - 
14 
15 such as alliances between local activists and professional actors- would ensure against 
16 essentialising NGOs. In so doing, the benefits of being located outside institutional 
18 spaces may be   exaggerated and counterproductive to building robust   democracies. 
19 
20 There is also evidence of how subaltern communities have worked in alliance with these 
21 
22 same professionals, for example, which may at times serve to sustain smaller 
23 organisations and movements (see Madlingozi, 2014). Nonetheless, the evidence 
24 
25 presented here suggests that in Kenya the opening of  democratic space and ‘civil    society’ 
26 
27 has still to find its way to excluded spaces like   Mathare. 
28 
29 
30 Thus, how NGOs might even become complicit in managing and structuring dissent in 
31 
32 ways that do not challenge underlying power relations requires contextual empirical 
33 analysis. Though we risk down playing many of the practical challenges and difficulties 
35 that NGOs face in working with grass roots communities, by focusing upon activist 
36 
37 perceptions we have identified several tangible reasons for their    exclusion from ‘civil 
38 
39 society’. NGOs are currently defending their political space from government attacks in 
40 Kenya, and this also takes up time and resources. And there have been some successes, 
41 
42 so this assessment is by no means     intended to be black and white. Without therefore 
43 
44 pointing fingers at NGOs as a whole, it is worth noting the structural deficiencies of civil 
45 society in terms of the context of deep class, political and ethnic divisions. Donors and 
46 
47 others, therefore, should still address how funding contributes to the divides    between 
48 
49 popular interests and elites described in the article. Though interventions may be 
50 targeted at doing the ‘right’ thing, this should not divert attention from less obvious but 
52 perhaps unexpected outcomes and effects. Certainly, we detect a ‘gap’ with civil society 
53 
54 at the grass roots level that under-develops concerted   action. 
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1 
2 
3 Notwithstanding this, we are not necessarily arguing for purely autonomous space, or, 
4 
5 we believe, reification in any simple terms of ‘grass roots’ in binary opposition to ‘civil 
6 society’. 
7 
8 
9 
10 Conclusion 
11 How then are we representing this grassroots initiative and what theories of violence 
12 
13 are youth activists utilising? It is apparent from the mobilisation efforts in Mathare that 
14 
15 youth attempts to rearticulate EJEs and the violence surrounding them in a way that 
16 brings the ‘everyday’ into focus – given that this is something that the activists as youth, 
18 and many as male, have to encounter on a daily basis- is a necessary starting point for 
19 
20 framing and developing action. Without romanticising their efforts, it can be argued that 
21 
22 the activists’ frustrations with NGO work, and indeed their marginalisation, become a 
23 powerful set of ‘shared symbols’ justifying their own efforts. Though action is 
24 
25 subsequently then also constrained or enabled by political opportunities and alliances -a 
26 
27 subject for further research- the articulation of their frustrations forms the impetus and 
28 point of divergence at which the activists envision alternative ways of working from 
29 
30 NGOs. It is principally to their own actions, however, that they turn to for justice, 
31 
32 because as one activist (R1) shared: ‘only the people can defend this    struggle’. 
33 
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